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Abstract
Technology has dramatically changed the way the military has disseminated informa-
tion over the last fifty years. The Air Force has adapted to the change by operating
a network with various ways to disseminate information. The Air Operating Center
(AOC) is a large contributor to disseminating information in the Air Force. When the
standard mode of sending information is disrupted, the AOC seeks both alternative
ways available to send information and long term approaches to decrease vulnerability
of its standard procedures. In this thesis, we seek to identify and quantify the most
vital components within a multi-mode communications network via a combination
of a set-based efficiency and set-based cost efficiency measures that utilize the all
pairs shortest path (APSP) problem and minimum cost flow (MCF) problem. We
capture the phenomenon that network components must work together to provide
flow by examining how the network performs when sets of arcs are disrupted. We
run 125 different computational experiments examining varying degrees of damage
experienced by the network. From these results, we deduce insights into the char-
acteristics of the most vital arcs in a multi-mode communication network which can
inform future fortification decisions.
Key words: Air Operating Center (AOC), Air Tasking Order (ATO), All Pairs Short-
est Path (APSP), Minimum Cost Flow (MCF), Set-Based Efficiency, Set-Based Cost
Efficiency, Network, Most Vital, Communication Network
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DETERMINING THE MOST VITAL ARCS WITHIN A MULTI-MODE
COMMUNICATION NETWORK USING SET-BASED MEASURES
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning, military units have always sent information from one point to
another, for example when a headquarters sends orders to the front lines. Currently,
the Air Force has a network that has various ways to transfer information to and
from different destinations. When this network is disrupted or destroyed the Air
Force needs to determine the best modes to distribute information. Herein, we model
the dissemination of information using a network, examine methods for determining
the best dissemination mode when faced with disruption, and quantify the most vital
arcs. Subsequently, the main contributions of this work are discussed.
1.1 Background
Technology has dramatically changed the way the military sends information over
the last fifty years. One cause for this change is the desire to increase the security
of the way in which information is sent; increased security ensures that the infor-
mation being sent arrives in the correct format and in a time that still makes the
information relevant to its intended destination. When the standard mode of dis-
tributing information is disrupted, military personnel look for other means to send
information. Deciding which is best has increased in difficulty since there are many
avenues through which information can be sent, and there are multiple factors which
need to be considered when assessing the utility of the dissemination mode, including
security, risk, and timeliness. The Air Operating Center (AOC) is a main Air Force
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contributor of disseminating information and they are most concerned about security
and timeliness of the information being sent.
The AOC has an important role for the Air Force as well as the Joint environment.
Joint Doctrine explains the AOC with the following definition:“[the AOC] provides
the capability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, execute, monitor, and assess the
activities of assigned or attached forces” [1]. It is comprised of individuals from all
the services and is considered a fully integrated command center.
The air tasking cycle that the AOC uses to produce an Air Tasking Order (ATO)
can be seen in Figure 1. Traditionally the air tasking cycle is a 72-hour iterative
process. The ATO production team is always working on the next day’s ATO. Each
component (Weaponeering and Allocation, Target Development, Objectives, Effects
and Guidance) completes its portion of the ATO days prior to ATO production. The
ATO production team is responsible for constructing, publishing, and disseminat-
ing the ATO and updates to the Special Instructions (SPINS) that accompany an
ATO [1]. The ATO and SPINS along with the Air Operations Directive (AOD),
and Airspace Command Order (ACO) “provide operational and tactical direction at
appropriate levels of detail” [1]. These documents need to be sent securely and in a
timely matter. The Joint Publication 3-30 states “a timely ATO is critical” [1].
The mode in which the ATO production team disseminates information may be
disrupted by a variety of ways such as enemy or weather. Since the ATO production
team faces these threats, it needs to understand and be prepared for such events by
identifying alternative dissemination modes and long-term approaches to decrease the
vulnerability of its standard procedures. To model this problem, a network composed
of nodes and arcs is utilized. In this context nodes can represent those locations
where information originates, waypoints, and locations needing information. Arcs
represent ways information can be transmitted from one location to another. These
2
Figure 1. AOC’s Air Tasking Cycle [1]
arcs have an associated cost parameter quantifying security, traversal time, distance
and level of disruption. Flow through the network represents the ATO and SPINS1.
By solving a minimum cost flow problem (MCF) on a network and an all pairs shortest
path (APSP) problem [2], we are able to determine (i) if paths exist in the network
allowing all demands to receive the ATO and (ii) if so, the least cost solution. We
solve both a MCF and APSP problems for different levels of disruption to the network,
denoted as scenarios. The last step in the scope of this thesis is to use the results from
MCF and APSP problems in two vitality equations to quantify the vitality of network
components2 thus creating a rank ordering. The rank ordered list can then be used
to perform a risk analysis on whether or not the vital components are vulnerable. We
combine these two measures in a culminating vitality score. Once the vulnerabilities
are identified it can drive the location of where to fortify with redundant components
in the network, thus increasing the resiliency of the network [2].
A decision support system (DSS) was created in Microsoft Office Excel 2007 to
1Henceforth, the use of ATO represents both ATO and SPINS
2Components can be arcs and/or nodes
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execute all algorithms, calculations, and output the results. The results produced by
the DSS will aid a decision maker to make informed decisions and identify where a
communication network’s vital arcs and vulnerabilities are located and where redun-
dant arcs should be placed to increase the network’s resiliency.
Due to the sensitive nature of an actual Air Force communication network, we
model and analyze an artificial multi-mode communication network. We perform
computational experiments on this artificial network and then compare, analyze, and
present the results produced.
1.2 Main Contributions and Summary
The five main contributions this research are: (i) a model for a multi-mode com-
munication network, (ii) determination of the best way to send information by solving
MCF and APSP problems, (iii) identifying the most vital components of a network
utilizing scenarios and calculations which capture how sets of arcs interact, (iv) vali-
dation of the model and method through computational testing on a communication
network, and (v) the development of a DSS which will help Air Force leaders to make
informed decisions on the future of ATO dissemination.
The thesis proceeds as follows, Chapter II presents relevant work related to the
application and methodology. Chapter III sets forth the formal mathematical problem
statement, model, and methodology. The results of computational tests on realistic
networks are presented in Chapter IV, including policy insights regarding the vitality
of network components. In Chapter V, we conclude and propose promising and
necessary avenues for future work.
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II. Literature Review
In this chapter, we discuss literature relevant to the application and methodological
approach. We explore the intricacies of the shortest path problem, specifically the all
pairs shortest path problem (APSP), and the minimum cost flow problem (MCF).
In addition to introducing the MCF and APSP, we discuss how they are relevant
to modeling a multi-mode communication network. Further, we examine how many
have defined and quantified resilient and vulnerable networks, identify most vital
components, and what has been explored in the realm of ATO dissemination. Lastly
we summarize aspects from the literature which we utilize to solve the problem.
2.1 Shortest Path
A shortest path problem identifies first if a path exist in a network from a specific
source node to a specific sink node and secondly which path is the shortest to traverse
from the two nodes [2]. The shortest path problem can be solved many different
ways some examples are: Dijkstra’s algorithm, Dijkstra’s two tree algorithm, or the
generic label-correcting algorithm [2, 3]. An extension of the shortest path problem
is the APSP problem which identifies the shortest path between all pairs of nodes
[2]. Dijkstra’s algorithm can be iteratively solved to find solutions to the APSP
problem. Further the Floyd-Warshall algorithm [2] can also be utilized to solve the
APSP problem.
2.2 Minimum Cost Flow Problem
Although similar to the shortest path problem, a MCF problem is used to identify
the cheapest option to send something through a network in order to meet a demand
within the network while not exceeding the capacity on any arc [2]. Where shortest
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path problem is determining the one path that is the shortest from the source node to
a sink node, MCF problem is solving to determine which path or paths is the cheapest
to take from all source nodes to all demand nodes. Just as there are many ways to
find the shortest path there are many ways to solve the MCF problem [2, 4, 5, 6]. We
utilize the negative cycle canceling algorithm outlined in Ahuja et al. [2]. MCF has
been used to solve transportation, distribution, and scheduling problems [2]. Some
of the more recent applications of MCF have been used in scheduling information
technology projects and assigning projects to human resources [7]. Dewil et al. [8]
formulate a maximum covering/patrol routing problem as a MCF problem. Rao et
al. [9] also use MCF in an attempt to minimize electricity cost. The minimum cost
flow problem’s versatility and ease of coding lends itself useful in many applications.
2.3 Resilient Networks
Using either APSP or MCF problems can lead to determine whether or not a
network is resilient to an attack, natural disaster, or other instances where a net-
work would be disrupted. Resiliency has been discussed in regards to many different
networks to include transportation networks [10], community networks [11], series
parallel networks [12], social ecological networks [13], and power networks [14]. A
broad definition of network resiliency is how well a network performs under duress.
In this section, we continue exploring how different application areas define and ad-
dress the concepts of resiliency when modeled on a network.
The resilience of a network, according to Colbourn [12], is the measure of the
network’s reliability. He suggests using the expected number of node pairs that com-
municate as a way to measure reliability, thus providing a statistic for the resilience
of a network. The connectivity or ability to communicate between pairs of nodes can
be extracted from the solution of an APSP problem. Colbourn presents an algorithm
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that computes the resilience of a series parallel network. Sterbenz et al. [15] define
resilience by how well the network provides the demanded service while disrupted.
Their analytical approach to evaluating network resilience includes a two-dimensional
state space defined by the operational state of the network and the services delivered.
Different scenarios are simulated on the network resulting in a point in the two-
dimensional space for each scenario. The combination of all points is denoted as the
resilience trajectory. The resilience of the network is then quantified by taking the
area under the resilience trajectory.
O’Rourke [11] defines resilience by how well the network “bounces” back after
experiencing a disruption. For a community network he uses a simple resilience
factor which is labeled as R. This factor is a measure of the networks resilience using
the expected loss in quality or probability of failure over the period of time it takes
for the network to recover. Barker et al. [16] define resilience almost verbatim as
O’Rourke. Both papers use time to quantify the resilience of a network. Barker et
al. [16] write that resilience can be measured by the time dependent ratio of recovery
over loss. They state that there are four parts to resilience: reliability, vulnerability,
survivability, and recoverability. The focus, when finding the resilience of a network,
is on the vulnerability and recoverability. These two aspects over time are used
to develop a resilience-based component importance measure (CIM). Additionally,
Barker et al. [16] use a 20-node and 30-link network to demonstrate their component
importance measure on a variety of different disruptive events.
2.4 Vulnerable Networks
Similar and often complimentary to network resilience, network vulnerability has
been discussed in regards to many different types of networks, such as computer
networks [17], power networks [18, 19], and community networks [11].
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The more robust a network is, the less vulnerable the network will be when it is
attacked [20]. Dekker et al. [20] defines robustness as a network’s ability to continue
performing while under or after an attack and if the topology of the graph is robust
it will be due to the alternate paths within the network. The authors state that
there are two ways in graph theory that can measure connectivity in a graph: node
connectivity and arc connectivity. They argue that node connectivity is more useful
in performing this connectivity metric. Node connectivity is defined in their paper
as the smallest number of nodes that if removed would disconnect or create a single
node graph.
Others have used a centrality index to aide in structural vulnerability analysis
[18]. Dwivedi et al. [18] uses the centrality definition set forth by Freeman et al. [21].
Freeman et al. [21] uses a betweenness-based measure of centrality, which means that
any component’s centrality degree is based on how often it is on the shortest path
between all components to all other components within a network. Armed with this
centrality index, Dwivedi et al. [18] ranks the network components (specifically arcs)
on their centrality index based on the portion of flow they carry through the network.
Those arcs with the highest centrality value are deemed most vital. Knowing which
arcs have the highest centrality index based on maximum flow through the network
allows for one to pinpoint the most vital components. Thus knowing where the
network is vulnerable.
2.5 Most Vital Network Components
Ventresca and Aleman [22] provide a good overview of the ways to determine the
most vital components in a network. The authors define robustness as the ability for
a network to continue operating while being attacked and list four ways to measure
robustness; graph entropy, largest component, efficiency, and pairwise connectivity.
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They then go on to mention six measures’ of centrality which attempt to quantify
the importance of a node; betweenness, closeness, degree, PageRank, Kleinberg’s
authority score, and leverage. All four robustness measures are used and compared
after two attacking strategies are executed on a network; (i) randomly choosing one of
the six centrality measures at each iteration and (ii) greedy choice which chooses one
of the six centrality measure that will cause the largest drop in robustness. Over all
the iterations there was little difference between the four robustness measures results.
The most vital arc in a network is defined by Ball and Golden [23] as the set of
arcs that if simultaneously removed would have the greatest increase on the shortest
distance between two specific nodes. For a transportation network, Novak et al. [24]
present a similar approach to Ball and Golden which they call Network Robustness
Index (NRI). This index is used to find the most vital arcs. The NRI approach evalu-
ates the change in cost between networks with and without disturbances. They used
three hypothetical models to compare the new approach to the traditional volume/ca-
pacity (V/C) ratio approach [25]. If V/C has a value larger than one then congestion
is expected along that arc. The authors show how these two methods identify dif-
ferent sets of arcs that are most vital, and it is argued that NRI presents a better
picture of the system-wide impacts opposed to the narrow localized V/C approach.
Wollmer [26], when referring to rail systems, defined the vital arc as the arc that
would decrease the network’s throughput the greatest. He determines the most vital
set of arcs by taking the dual of a planar network and solves the shortest route problem
thus identifying the set which is the minimum cut of a maximum flow problem. He
states that his algorithm could be used to find where a transportation network would
be sensitive to road closures or traffic accidents that tend to cause a decrease in the
maximum flow through the network or where roads could be added to increase the
maximum flow. Ratliff et al. [27] define the most vital arcs similarly to Wollmer [26]
9
as the set of arcs that if removed simultaneously would cause the greatest decrease
in throughput. They developed a procedure to find these set of arcs by sequentially
modifying the network making cuts resulting in a minimum cut. It is recommended
that this procedure be used with logistics or communications networks, where there
may be an entity wanting to defend the network and another entity trying to interdict.
Latora et al. [28] define the critical components of a network as those that when
removed cause the largest change between the efficiency of the network before and
after the removal. The efficiency measure used is the same one referenced in Ventresca
and Aleman [22]. This metric is the sum over all pairs of nodes, the inverse of the
shortest path value between the pairs. As mentioned, this calculation is done before
and after the removal of a component. Thus the importance of the component is
the difference of efficiency before removal and after removal. Then those components
with the highest change in efficiency are the most vital. To show versatility they
apply their method to both a communication network and a terrorist network. We
use this efficiency measure, but instead of removing one component we remove a set of
components. It is the interaction of sets of network components that allow a network
to perform. Thus, the concentration on sets represents an attempt to capture the
importance of how the network responds rather than one single component.
Alderson et al. [29] argues that currently there is no set of all encompassing rules
that find the most vital components when the components work together to produce
a capacity or throughput. They state that it really depends on which set of arcs are
damaged and takes analysis of the problem to determine which rule or set of rules
best fit the problem at hand. They provide examples and ways to assess the critical
components and the worst-case set of components. The examples range from as small
as seven nodes and 9 arcs to the 1950s Soviet Train Network which has 50 nodes and
approximately 90 arcs. Using this concept that network vitality is network specific,
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we focus on communication networks, such as an ATO dissemination network.
2.6 ATO Dissemination
With the exception of Allen [30], little has been written or researched about the
dissemination of the ATO. Allen seeks to answer two main questions, the first being
whether or not the current method of dissemination gets the job done. The second
question is focused on the pros and cons of additional methods. He compares options
that are used to disseminate the ATO in the joint environment (air gap, Multi-
Level Security, web/Global Broadcast Service (GBS)) and states that web/GBS is
the most suitable option to accomplish the mission. However, he does state that
further research should be done prior to selecting one method over others.
2.7 Summary
Herein we provided an overview of APSP and MCF, both of which we use to
quantify the vital components of a multi-mode communication network. Further, we
examine previous quantifications of vulnerability and vitality which both motivate
and compliment my approach. We proceed by providing the methodology we used
for finding the most vital components in a network.
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III. Methodology
We provide in this chapter the model and methodology utilized for determining the
most vital components of a multi-mode communication network, such as an ATO
dissemination network. First, we outline the mathematical notation describing the
network, we put forth the formulation and algorithms for solving the all pairs short-
est path (APSP) problem and the minimum cost flow (MCF) problem. Using the
solutions of APSP and MCF, we describe the calculation for determining the vital
network components which we denote as the set-based efficiency and the set-based
cost efficiency measures. Combining these two measures, we set forth an arc vital-
ity ranking, therby indicating the most vital arcs. We begin by representing the
multi-mode communication network as a network described in the next section.
3.1 Mathematical Notation and Formulations
Let G = (N,A) be a network defined by node set N and arc set A. Each arc
(i, j) ∈ A has a cost cij, capacity uij, and level of disruption βij = 1 if available and 0
otherwise. Cost can represent a variety of realistic entities, including time, security,
and distance. A lower cost value indicates a greater incentive to utilize the arc (e.g.
higher level of confidence in security). The length of the shortest path from node i
to node j is denoted dij. Define s as the source where flow originates and τ as the
sink where flow terminates. The decision variable xij represents the flow on each arc
(i, j) ∈ A. For each node i ∈ N , define bi to equal the supply (positive), demand
(negative), and 0 otherwise.
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3.2 Minimum Cost Flow Problem
On this network, we determine the MCF through the network. The MCF problem
is considered the most fundamental of all network flow problems [2]. The problem can
easily be defined as trying “to determine a least cost option of moving a commodity
through a network in order to satisfy demands at certain nodes from available supplies
at other nodes” [2]. The minimum cost flow which we solve for is directly dependent
on the set of available arcs in the network (i.e. those with βij = 1). Thus, we extend
the traditional MCF linear programming formulation [2] to include the availability of
arcs.
Minimize
∑
(i,j)∈A
cijxij (1a)
s.t.
∑
{j:(i,j)∈A}
xij −
∑
{j:(j,i)∈A}
xji = bi ∀ i ∈ N (1b)
0 ≤ xij ≤ uijβij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A (1c)
Equation (1a) sets forth the traditional MCF objective which multiplies the cost for
each arc by its flow. Constraint (1b) is the mass balance constraint which ensures
that the total flow leaving node i is not more than what is entering node i and at the
same time is still meeting the demand, bi. Our alteration to the formulation appears
in Constraint (1c). This constraint limits the flow on each arc by its capacity if it is
available and 0, otherwise.
This formulation can be solved to optimality using a commercial solver. However,
there are exact algorithms for solving a MCF problem which are appropriate for the
extension to the problem presented. The cycle-canceling algorithm [2] is one, which
we outline in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Cycle-Canceling Algorithm for Solving MCF [2]
1: Input: G = (N,A), for each arc : {cost=cij, capacity=uij}, and each node:
{supply or demand=bi}
2: Determine a feasible flow xij on the network satisfying all bi values (e.g. maximum
flow)
3: Create residual network G′ = (N ′, A′) where N ′ = N,A′ = A ∪ {(j, i) : (i, j) ∈ A
and xij > 0},
4: Calculate residual capacity
rij =
{
uij − xij, ∀ (i, j) ∈ A
xij, ∀ (i, j) ∈ A′ \A.
5: Set cij = −cij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A′\A
6: while G′ = (N ′, A′) contains a negative cycle, C do
7: Let: γ = min
(i,j)∈C
rij.
8: Update flow values on G′
xij =

xij + γ, if (i, j) ∈ C ∩ A
xij − γ, if (i, j) ∈ C and (j, i) ∈ C ∩ A′ \A
xij, otherwise.
9: Update G′ as in Step 3 and Step 4.
10: end while
11: Output the minimum cost flow value and solution.
In this algorithm, first a feasible flow is found which satisfies all of the demand. Ford-
Fulkerson’s maximum flow algorithm [2] is one which can find a feasible flow. The
cycle-canceling algorithm continues by rerouting this flow through the identification
of negative cycles. A negative cycle in the residual network indicates that flow can
be rerouted, still maintaining the satisfaction of demand, in a cheaper way. The
algorithm terminates when no negative cycles remain.
A benefit to using the cycle-canceling algorithm as opposed to solving the linear
programming formulation is that it does not require the use of a commercial solver.
Thus, it can be implemented in any programming language. As will be discussed
more thoroughly in Chapter IV, we have implemented the cycle-canceling algorithm
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in VBA within Microsoft Excel 2007. This provides a familiar platform for users
managing the application of ATO dissemination discussed in Chapter I.
3.3 All Pairs Shortest Path Problem
On the network set forth in Section 3.1, we also solve for the shortest path between
all pairs of nodes. The shortest path problem is considered to be the simplest of all
network flow problems [2], which seeks to determine the shortest length from a set
origin to a set destination. This problem can be solved utilizing the MCF linear
programming formulation outlined in Equations (1a)-(1c). With this formulation, by
setting bs = 1, bτ = −1, and bi = 0 ∀i ∈ N \ {s, τ}, we can find the shortest path
from origin s to destination τ . For the APSP problem, we seek to determine not the
shortest path from one origin to one destination, but the shortest path between all
pairs of nodes. As follows, we iteratively solve the shortest path problem by changing
the origin and destination.
As was the case for the MCF problem, the shortest path problem can also be
solved via alternative exact algorithms not requiring commercial solvers. Dijkstra’s
algorithm is one such algorithm [2]. Dijkstra’s algorithm is useful because it not only
finds the shortest path from s to τ but finds the shortest path from s to all other nodes
within the network. It accomplishes this by scanning out from s and maintaining a
distance label for each node which acts as an upper bound on the shortest path to that
node [2]. Throughout the execution of the algorithm, it maintains two groups, one
group that has been permanently labeled and the other group is temporarily labeled.
The distance label for all permanent nodes is the shortest distance from s to that
node. This algorithm continues until all nodes are permanently labeled, resulting in
the shortest distance from s to all other nodes. Hence, we can determine a solution
to the APSP problem by solving O(|N |) shortest path problems, one for each node
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in the network, by changing the origin. Because of this result and not requiring the
use of a commercial solver, we have implemented the iterative solving of Dijkstra’s
algorithm to determine a solution to the APSP problem.
3.4 Vitality Measures
Using the solutions from the APSP problem and MCF problem, we calculate
the vitality of arcs within the network. The two vitality measures proposed herein
are motivated by the work of Latora et al. [28]. The traditional efficiency measure
defined by Latora et al. [28] is presented in Equations (2) and (3). In Equation (2)
the efficiency of the network is calculated by taking the average of the inverse of the
length of the shortest path between all pairs of nodes. This calculation is utilized
in Equation (3) which computes the change in the efficiency of the network when
a network component i (arc or node) is removed. Latora et al. [28] states that in
contrast to calculating the change in efficiency when a single component is removed,
it can also be calculated when a set of components are removed. The examination of
sets of components is particularly important in networks, as it is the combination and
interaction of network components which allows a network to perform (e.g. deliver
flow to demand nodes). However, even with the examination of sets of components it
is desirable to attribute a vitality score to individual components, thereby informing
fortification decisions.
As such, we utilize the efficiency measure outlined in Equations (2) and (3) with
sets of arcs removed. By examining many scenarios of arcs which are removed, we
then attribute a vitality score back to each arc.
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E(G) =
1
|N |(|N | − 1)
∑
i 6=j∈G
1
dij
(2)
∆E = E(G)− E(G− componenti) i = 1, ..., A, (3)
Define K as the set of possible scenarios considered. For each k ∈ K, define arc
set Ak as the set of available arcs, specifically Ak = {A|βkij = 1} where βkij = 1 when
arc is available in scenario k. From this we define Gk = (N,Ak) as the network under
scenario k. Without loss of generality, we focus on the availability of arcs, as nodes
can be equivalently represented as arcs. Define wk to represent the weight of scenario
k. This weight may convey the likelihood of scenario occurring or the scenario’s
importance. With this we define the new set-based efficiency measure denoted eij for
all arcs (i, j) ∈ A. Directly influenced by Equation (3) from Latora et al. [28], we
calculate the change in network efficiency for scenario k, denoted ∆Ek, via Equation
(4). Combining wk, βkij, and ∆E
k we introduce the set-based efficiency measure in
Equation (5) where
∑|K|
k=1(1 − βkij) calculates the number of scenarios with which
arc (i, j) is disrupted. Hence, the efficiency of arc (i, j), eij is calculated by taking
the average weighted change in efficiency of those scenarios with which arc (i, j) is
disrupted.
∆Ek = E(G)− E(Gk) (4)
eij =
1∑|K|
k=1(1− βkij)
|K|∑
k=1
(1− βkij)∆Ekwk (5)
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The calculation of the first efficiency measure was based on the length of the
shortest path between all pairs of nodes. For the second vitality measure we present,
the calculation is based on the minimum cost flow. We continue the examination of
sets of arcs which leads to an individual arc based calculation. Define ∆Ck as the
difference in the minimum cost flow between network Gk and G, as shown in Equation
(6).
∆Ck =
∑
(i,j)∈Ak
cijx
k
ij −
∑
(i,j)∈A
cijxij (6)
As was done in Equation (5) for the set-based efficiency measure, we combine wk,
βkij, and ∆C
k in the new set-based cost efficiency measure, hij, set forth in Equation
(7). This equation calculates hij as the average weighted change in the minimum cost
flow for the scenarios in which βkij = 0.
hij =
1∑|K|
k=1(1− βkij)
|K|∑
k=1
(1− βkij)∆Ckwk (7)
3.5 Determining Vitality
For each vitality measure, eij and hij, a ranked list is created where r
e
ij and r
h
ij
represents the ranking of arc (i, j) ∈ A for set-based efficiency and set-based cost
efficiency, respectively. A lower ranking indicates arc (i, j) had a greater eij and hij
value. This higher value indicates it was apart of scenarios which led to the greatest
decrease in network performance.
To produce a ranked list of the most vital arcs we combine both metrics. To ensure
the combination of both measures does not consider one measure more important than
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another, we normalize both between 0 and 1. Define eˆij and hˆij as the normalized
set-based efficiency and set-based cost efficiency, respectively. The normalization is
calculated via Equations (8) and (9).
eˆij =
eij − min
(i,j)∈A
eij
max
(i,j)∈A
eij − min
(i,j)∈A
eij
(8)
hˆij =
hij − min
(i,j)∈A
hij
max
(i,j)∈A
hij − min
(i,j)∈A
hij
(9)
Using these calculations, we define a combined vitality measure vij for all (i, j) ∈ A
presented in Equation (10). Which adds the normalized set-based efficiency and set-
based cost efficiency measures.
vij = eˆij + hˆij (10)
The vij values are utilized to create a ranked list. This ranking is our final vitality
score. Those with a lower ranking indicate the most vital arcs.
In the next chapter we validate the use of vij, our vitality measure, in an artificial
multi-mode communication network and discuss the results and analysis from 125
computational experiments.
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IV. Computational Results
In this section we describe the network structure and demonstrate how to use the
minimum cost flow (MCF) problem and all pairs shortest path (APSP) problem to
inform the development of set-based cost efficiency and set-based efficiency vitality
measures. Additionally, we validate these vitality measures explained in Chapter III
and show how they directly feed the calculation to identify vital components for a
communications network by performing computational experiments.
4.1 Network
For the computational experiments we consider a multi-mode artificial communi-
cation network with |N | = 52 and |A| = 752, see Figure 2 for an illustration of the
network. Each node i ∈ {1, 2} is connected to all nodes j ∈ {3, . . . , 27} by four paral-
lel arcs (i, j) with four distinct costs 1, 2, 3, or 4. Additionally, each node i ∈ {1, 2} is
connected to all nodes j ∈ {28, . . . , 52} by three parallel arcs (i, j) with three distinct
costs 1, 2, and 4. Define nodes 1 and 2 as supply nodes and nodes j ∈ {3, . . . , 52} as
demand nodes. In this network, arcs connect the nodes in {3, . . . , 27} together and
those nodes in {28, . . . , 52} together. Each node i ∈ {3, . . . , 27} is connected to five
randomly selected distinct nodes j ∈ {3, . . . , 27}, where i 6= j via two parallel arcs
(i, j). For each arc (i, j), a random cost of 1, 2, 3, or 4 is generated and set equal
to cij. Similarly, each node i ∈ {28, . . . , 52} is connected to three randomly selected
distinct nodes j ∈ {28, . . . , 52}, where i 6= j via two parallel arcs (i, j). These arcs
are also assigned a random cost of 1, 2, 3, or 4. We augment the network with a
dummy node i = 53 to ensure a feasible MCF can be achieved. This node is con-
nected to all demand nodes j ∈ {3, . . . , 52} via arcs with an arbitrarily high cost
set to 100. This high cost ensures that the other options in the network are more
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desirable. Additional augmentation is done on the network with the addition of a
super source and super sink defined as s = 54 and τ = 55, respectively. The super
source has bs = 50 and super sink has bτ = −50 indicating the supply and demand to
meet all 50 demand nodes, respectively. The super source s is connected by one arc
(s, i) to each node i ∈ {1, 2, 53} with a capacity usi = 50 and cost csi = 0. The super
sink is connected via one arc (j, τ) from each node j ∈ {3, ..., 52} with a capacity
ujτ = 1 and cost ciτ = 0. Knowing that no more than 50 will flow through the net-
work based on bs = 50, we place a non-limiting constraint on each arc (i, j) by setting
the capacity uij = 50 for all arcs (i, j) with i ∈ {1, 2, 53} and j ∈ {3, . . . , 52}. The
non-limiting constraint with uij = 50 is also applied to the sets of arcs (i, j) for nodes
i, j ∈ {3, . . . , 27} with i 6= j and i, j ∈ {28, . . . , 52} with i 6= j. Arcs (i, j) where
i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {3, . . . , 52} are classified as “Type 1” and arcs (i, j) are classified
“Type 2” when i, j ∈ {3, . . . , 52} with i 6= j. This classification is a way to separate
the topology of the network for added analysis. Type 1 arcs directly connect the
supply nodes to the demand nodes and Type 2 arcs connect demand nodes together.
Figure 2 provides a visual of the network. Due to the overabundance of arc
redundancy, some arcs in the network are not shown in the figure.
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Figure 2. We show a graphical representation of G. Present are arcs from the super
source node 54 to supply nodes 1, 2, and dummy node 53. The arcs that originate from
node 2 mimic those that originate from node 1. In the set of nodes {3, . . . , 27} there are
two parallel arcs that connect each node with five other nodes in the set. In the set of
nodes {28, . . . , 52} there are two parallel arcs that connect each node with three other
nodes in the set. Node 53 is connected to all the nodes in the set {3, . . . , 52} by one arc.
Each node in the set {3, . . . , 52} is connected by one arc to node 55.
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4.2 Scenarios
For the computational experiments, we consider five different degrees of damage,
specifically when 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% of the arcs are damaged. For each of
these five damage percentages, we create twenty five random instances by uniformly
at random selecting the appropriate number of arcs to be damaged. This random
selection is conducted using the Microsoft Excel random function and results in 125
different scenarios.
These computational experiments are conducted in a decision support system
(DSS) built in Microsoft Office Excel 2007 with the Visual Basic for Applications
environment. The DSS inputs a network, solves for both the MCF and APSP solu-
tions, computes both vitality measures, and produces a final ranked order list of the
most vital arcs within the network. The results shown hereafter were performed on
a desktop with 3.40 GHz AMD A4-5300B processor and 8.00 GB of RAM.
4.3 Implementation
Both the network described in Section 4.1 and the scenarios from Section 4.2 in
the form of Excel files are used as input into the DSS mentioned in Section 4.2. The
DSS then calculates ∆Ek and ∆Ck for each damage scenario k ∈ K according to
Equations (3) and (6). These values are then used to calculate the two arc vitality
measures: set-based efficiency (eij) and set-based cost efficiency (hij). Table 1 shows
the values associated with each percentage of damage: the total arcs in the network;
total number of damaged arcs; and scenario weight wk value used in Equation (5)
and (7). The weight (wk) utilized for each damaged percentage is calculated as the
inverse of the number of damaged arcs. With this calculation, the impact felt by a
damage scenario is equally distributed between all arcs in that particular scenario.
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Table 1. Values associated with each degree of damage
Percentage
Total
Arcs
Total
Damaged
Weight
0% 752 0 0
10% 752 75 1/75
20% 752 151 1/151
30% 752 226 1/226
40% 752 301 1/301
50% 752 376 1/376
Once the DSS calculates eij and hij it continues and solves for Equations (8),
(9), and (10), eˆij, hˆij, and vij, respectively. We then rank order vij, resulting in the
final output, which a sample of this output is shown in Table 2. Interpreting Table 2
beginning from the left most column going towards the right most column the table
displays the number of each arc, where the arc originates (i), ends (j), cost (cij), the
arc’s category (CAT) as Type 1 or Type 2, the number of times the arc is disrupted, in
the 125 scenarios the value of both the normalized set-based efficiency measure (eˆij),
eˆij rank, normalized set-based cost efficiency measure (hˆij), hˆij rank, the summation
of eˆij and hˆij, (vij), and lastly the ranking associated with arc (i, j) according to vij.
Table 2. Sample DSS output showing characteristics of each arc and final eˆij , hˆij , and
vij values and rankings.
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4.4 Results
In this section we describe what analysis was done on the results and output from
the DSS after the implementation outlined in Section 4.3. We begin by analyzing
the change of efficiency and cost efficiency at each degree of disruption. This analysis
allows us to quantify how the network reacts at each degree of disruption. Along
the horizontal axis in Figure 3 and Figure 4 is the percentage of arcs disrupted and
the vertical axis displays the average change across each percentage. We found that
the average change in the APSP (∆Ek) and average change in MCF (∆Ck) values
increased as the percentage of disruption increased. We note in Figure 3 that the rate
of ∆Ek appears linear. However, in Figure 4 we note that as 40% and 50% of the arcs
are damaged the ∆Ck is more dramatic than 10% and 20%, indicating a nonlinear
trend. The insight drawn from this is that a defender’s cost efficiency will decrease
at a greater rate after 30% of the network is disrupted rather than when the network
is disrupted 30% or less.
Figure 3. The average ∆Ek value as the percentage of disrupted arcs increases.
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Figure 4. The average ∆Ck value as the percentage of disrupted arcs increases.
.
The next set of analysis is utilized to assess the vitality of arcs in the network. In
Figure 5, we display the eij ranking vs hij ranking for each arc. On the horizontal
axis is hij rank from 0 to 752 and on the vertical axis is the eij rank from 0 to 752.
For each metric, 0 is considered most vital, indicating that arcs near the origin are
considered most vital in both metrics. Type 1 arcs are displayed as a circle and Type
2 arcs are displayed as a addition sign. For each scenario, we randomly generated
which arcs are disrupted based on the degree of disruption. The color indicates how
many times an arc was disrupted in the 125 scenarios. Upon initial inspection, we
notice that there is a linear relationship between eij and hij. Additionally, there is a
higher concentration of dark blue points near the figure’s origin and a concentration
of dark red points near the top most right corner. This phenomenon is due to the
random generation of scenarios and equal weighting for each scenario. These two
together create cases where some arcs are only disrupted during the higher percentage
scenarios (the dark blue points near the origin), when the change in efficiency and
cost efficiency is the greatest. Thus, giving them a higher vij value than those arcs
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that are disrupted in many scenarios including the 10% scenarios (the dark red points
in top most right corner) when the change in efficiency and cost efficiency is least.
Without an appropriate weight assigned to each scenario it can skew the results to
misrepresent which arcs are most vital.
Figure 5. The eij and hij rank for all arcs within the network with a w
k = 1 applied to
each scenario.
To address the misrepresentation of which arcs are most vital, we applied a weight-
ing as shown in Table 1, rather than an equal weighting. This weighting change leads
to different eij and hij values, thus changing the ranking. In Figure 6, similarly to
Figure 5, we display the eˆij ranking vs hˆij ranking for each arc with these weights
applied. Once the weight was applied the linear relationship which was seen before
is no longer evident, highlighting what is most important between the two metrics.
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Figure 6. All the arcs within the network after a weight is applied to each scenario.
Table 3, 4, and 5 display a rank order list of the top 75 most vital arcs in the
network according to vij. In addition to the rank according to vij, Table 3, 4, and
5 displays the following: the arc number associated with arc (i, j), the originating
location (node i), destination (node j), the cost to flow down arc (i, j), the type of
arc, the number of times the arc is disrupted over the 125 scenarios, eˆij value, the
rank of arc (i, j) according to eˆij, hˆij value, the rank of arc (i, j) according to hˆij, the
summation of eˆij and hˆij with vij, and each arc’s rank according to vij.
The three Tables 3, 4, and 5, highlight four varying characteristics of the top 75
most vital arcs. The first being that the cost for each arc varies from 1, 2, 3, and
4 throughout all 75 arcs. The second varying characteristic is that half of the most
vital arcs according to vij were Type 1, implying that the type of arc did not drive
whether or not it was in the top 75. The number of times each arc was disrupted
varied as well which was our desire by applying the appropriate weight. We wanted
to ensure the number of times an arc was disrupted did not positively or negatively
affect the results by favoring either a more disrupted arc or a less disrupted arc. The
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last characteristic to note is that the ranking for both eˆij and hˆij are not exact for any
of the top 75 arcs and some are quite different. For instance, eˆij ranks arc number
271 as 183 and hˆij ranks it the 8th most vital. This can be seen in the reverse with
arc number 741. However, there are some arcs where they both are closer to the same
eˆij and hˆij rank, as in the case for arc 27 or 478. As expected, those arcs that are
closer in rank between eˆij and hˆij rise to the top in vij ranking. However, there were
only 30 arcs that both eˆij and hˆij identified as being in the top 75 most vital arcs.
Table 3. A rank ordered table of the top 75 arcs after applying a weight, according to
vij ranking: 1-30
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Table 4. A rank ordered table of the top 75 arcs after applying a weight, according to
vij ranking: 31-60
Table 5. A rank ordered table of the top 75 arcs after applying a weight, according to
vij ranking: 61-75
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Figure 7 displays Table 3, 4, and 5 in a graphical form giving a different insight
into the results. Both axises are from 0 to 450 with the horizontal axis being hij
ranking and the vertical axis being eij ranking of the top 75 most vital arcs. The
colors represent the number of times an arc was disrupted and the circles are Type
1 arcs and an addition sign is Type 2 arcs. Based on the figure there is an even
distribution of the number of times an arc is disrupted as well as where the arc is
located within the topology of the network. Note that there are arcs in the top 75
that are ranked significantly higher by eij than hij and vice versa. The outlying arcs
that are ranked higher by eij than hij are Type 2 and those outlying arcs that are
ranked higher by hij than eij are Type 1 arcs. When we looked at the top 75 arcs
according to eij there were only 25 of the 75 that were Type 1 and when we looked
at the top 75 according to hij it was a near split with 42 of the 75 that were Type
1. This highlights the difference between the two metrics, that they are not mirror
images of the other and the importance of including both metrics.
Figure 7. The top 75 arcs according to vij displayed graphically.
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To verify that vij was correctly calculating which arcs are most vital, we ran
another set of scenarios and instead of random disruption we took a greedy approach.
A greedy approach represents an informed decision maker who knows which arcs are
most vital to the network and chooses a percentage to disrupt. To implement a
greedy approach, we selected a percentage of the top most vital arcs according to vij
to disrupt. We chose five percentages 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% which allowed
us to compare with those scenarios that were randomly disrupted. Figure 8 displays
the degree of disruption along the horizontal axis and the average change in value on
the vertical axis. The colors represent ∆Ek and ∆Ck for both a random disruption
and a greedy disruption. Applying the greedy approach resulted in both ∆Ek and
∆Ck values higher then when the network was disrupted randomly and this was the
case for each percentage damaged. This provided validation that the metrics correctly
identified are the most vital arcs in the network.
Figure 8. A bar graph displaying the average change in value at each degree of disrup-
tion while comparing random disruption approach to a greedy disruption approach for
both ∆Ek and ∆Ck
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Summary. In this chapter we applied the methodology from Chapter III to
a multi-mode communication network in order to identify the most vital arcs within
the network. We did this by using a new vitality metric and proceeded to validate the
metric by comparing the 125 randomly generated computational tests to five greedy
computational tests. These tests not only validated the model but also assigned a
value to each arc which allowed us to rank order all the arcs within the network.
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V. Conclusion
The distribution of information, specifically through a communication network is key
to ensure the Air Force is successful during training, day to day operations, and most
importantly during conflict. One of the main contributors of the Air Force for dissem-
inating information is the Air Operating Center (AOC). The number one objective
of the AOC is to enable the Air Force to be successful in it’s mission. This objec-
tive can only be achieved by successfully disseminating information. If the AOC’s
communication network is significantly disrupted it could threaten their success and
thus the success of the Air Force mission. The threat to a failed mission highlights
the importance of knowing the network’s topology, knowing how information will be
sent in times of disruption, and identify it’s vulnerabilities. Identifying a network’s
vulnerabilities begins with knowing what is important within the network. The ob-
jective of this paper was to identify the most vital components within a multi-mode
communications network.
To meet this objective, we quantify the vital components within a network via
a combination of a set-based efficiency and set-based cost efficiency measures. With
both of these measures, we identify that a network operates to its full potential when
arcs correctly interact together. Thus, we examine the network performance when
sets of arcs are disrupted in the network, which we denote as scenarios. We expand
the traditional efficiency measure (see Latora et al. [28]) and calculate the change in
the network performance, specifically all pairs shortest path value, for each scenario.
This value is then attributed to all arcs which were disrupted in the scenario, thus
indicating that each arc contributed to the degradation in the network performance.
The same concept is applied to a set-based cost efficiency measure. We calculate the
change in the minimum cost flow for the disrupted network under each scenario in
comparison to the best minimum cost flow. This value is then attributed to the arcs
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in each scenario. We combine these two arc-based values to form a set-based vitality
metric. Based on this metric we rank order the most vital arcs within a network.
We validated the set-based vitality metric by first creating a model to replicate
a multi-mode communications network. Using this model, we used minimum cost
flow (MCF) and all pairs shortest path (APSP) problems to determine the best way
to disseminate information. The values produced from solving the MCF and APSP
problems were then used in our two new set-based vitality measures. The exami-
nation of the interaction and validation of the model was done by performing 125
computational experiments on different weighted scenarios. To capture the charac-
teristics of both metrics they were normalized and summed creating what we define
as our set-based vitality metric. This metric produced a value that achieves the end
goal of providing a decision maker with a single rank ordered list of the arcs that are
most vital to the network.
After completing all computational tests, we analyzed the results and reported our
findings. The first finding was the degree of disruption had an impact on both the
change in efficiency (∆Ek) which had a linear change and the change in cost efficiency
(∆Ck) which had a greater percentage of change when the degree of disruption was
greater than 30% disruption than when the disruption is less than 30%. The second
finding was the impact of not applying an appropriate weight to scenarios and how it
may skew the ranking of which arcs are most vital. It was also apparent that whether
the arc was Type 1 or 2 did not exclude it from being in the top 75 most vital arcs.
The final finding came from the validation of the vitality metric, vij. We compared
the change in value for ∆Ek and ∆Ck when the disruption was random and when
the disruption was the most vital arcs. This comparison was done for each degree of
disruption and in every case for both ∆Ek and ∆Ck the change in value was greater
when the most vital arcs were disrupted.
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For future study, we propose that the methodology proposed in Chapter III and
demonstrated in Chapter IV should be applied to a real world communication network
as well as other network types. A shortcoming with this methodology is that it may
not be applicable to all networks. Research needs to be conducted to determine the
types of networks the methodology could be applied toward. Additional research
should also be done on applying weights to the different metrics in the event one of
the metrics is more important based on the network evaluated. Experiments should
be conducted to evaluate whether or not other metrics could be incorporated to
determine most vital components, such as graph entropy and largest component.
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